Integration-segregation decisions under general value functions : "Create your own bundle -- choose 1, 2, or all 3 !" by Egozcue, Martín et al.
Integration-segregation decisions under general value
functions : ”Create your own bundle – choose 1, 2, or all
3 !”
Mart´ın Egozcue, Se´bastien Massoni, Wing-Keung Wong, Ricˇardas Zitikis
To cite this version:
Mart´ın Egozcue, Se´bastien Massoni, Wing-Keung Wong, Ricˇardas Zitikis. Integration-
segregation decisions under general value functions : ”Create your own bundle – choose 1,
2, or all 3 !”. Documents de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2012.57 - ISSN :
1955-611X. 2012. <halshs-00747008>
HAL Id: halshs-00747008
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00747008
Submitted on 30 Oct 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 Documents de Travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Integration-segregation decisions under general value 
functions : “Create your own bundle — choose 1, 2, or all 3 !” 
 
Martín EGOZCUE, Sébastien MASSONI, 
Wing-Keung WONG, Ri!ardas ZITIKIS 
 
2012.57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13 
http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-de-travail/ 
ISSN : 1955-611X 
 
Integration-segregation decisions under general value func-
tions: “Create your own bundle – choose 1, 2, or all 3!”
Mart´ın Egozcue1
Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la Repu´blica, Uruguay, Montevideo 11200,
Uruguay
Se´bastien Massoni
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne – Universite´ Paris 1, and Paris School of Economics,
Paris Cedex 13, France
Wing-Keung Wong
Department of Economics and the Institute for Computational Mathematics, Hong Kong
Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
Ricˇardas Zitikis
Department of Statistical and Actuarial Sciences, University of Western Ontario, London,
Ontario N6A 5B7, Canada
1Corresponding author: megozcue@correo.um.edu.uy
1
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.57
Abstract. Whether to keep products segregated (e.g., unbundled) or integrate some or all
of them (e.g., bundle) has been a problem of profound interest in areas such as portfolio
theory in finance, risk capital allocations in insurance, and marketing of consumer products.
Such decisions are inherently complex and depend on factors such as the underlying product
values and consumer preferences, the latter being frequently described using value functions,
also known as utility functions in economics. In this paper we develop decision rules for
multiple products, which we generally call ‘exposure units’ to naturally cover manifold sce-
narios spanning well beyond ‘products.’ Our findings show, for example, that the celebrated
Thaler’s principles of mental accounting hold as originally postulated when the values of all
exposure units are positive (i.e., all are gains) or all negative (i.e., all are losses). In the case
of exposure units with mixed-sign values, decision rules are much more complex and rely on
cataloging the Bell-number of cases that grow very fast depending on the number of expo-
sure units. Consequently, in the present paper we provide detailed rules for the integration
and segregation decisions in the case up to three exposure units, and partial rules for the
arbitrary number of units.
Keywords: Bundling, marketing, mental accounting, portfolio theory, value function, utility
function, majorization, functional inequalities, Bell number.
Re´sume´. Le choix de vendre des biens l’unite´ ou en ”‘package” est un sujet d’inte´reˆt dans de
multiples applications telles que la the´orie de portefeuille en finance, l’allocation du capital
risque en assurance et le marketing de biens de consommation. De telles de´cisions sont
complexes et dpendent de facteurs tels que la valeur sous-jacente des biens et les pre´fe´rences
des consommateurs. Dans cet article nous proposons des re`gles de de´cision pour des biens
multiples et nous proposons une extension du fameux principe de Thaler de comptabilit
mentale qui ne s’appliquait originellement qu’au cas de deux biens de meˆme signe (gains ou
pertes). Dans le cas de biens mixtes multiples, les de´cisions deviennent plus complexes et
reposent sur les partitions des nombres de Bell qui augmentent de manire exponentielle avec
le nombre de biens. Ainsi dans cet article nous pre´sentons des re`gles de´taille´es dans le choix
d’inte´grer ou de se´parer trois biens ainsi que des re`gles partielles pour un nombre arbitraire
de biens.
Keywords: Package, marketing, comptabilite´ mentale, the´orie de portefeuille, fonctions
d’utilite´, majorisation, ine´galite´s fonctionnelles, nombre de Bell.
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1 Introduction
Quite often do we want, or are required, to decide whether to combine all or only some
products, objects, subjects, etc., which we call exposure units throughout the paper – a
convenient term that we borrow from the actuarial credibility theory (cf., e.g., Klugman et
al., 2008). All exposure units have attached to them experience values, which we simply
call experiences and denote by x, y, z, xi, etc. Given a value/utility function, we want to
determine if all or only some exposure units should be integrated (e.g., bundled, etc.) or
segregated (e.g., unbundled, etc.).
This topic is intimately related to the concept of mental accounting introduced by Thaler
(1980, 1985). Specifically, mental accounting (Thaler, 1999) is “the set of cognitive opera-
tions used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track of financial
activities.” Thaler (1980, 1985) defined a pattern of optimal behaviours depending on the
type of exposure units with positive and negative experiences, concentrating on the case of
two units.
The actual or perceived experiences are reflected by a value function v : R → R, which
is increasing and, in order to reflect the degree of risk aversion, is also frequently assumed
to be convex for non-positive experiences (x ≤ 0) and concave for non-negative experiences
(x ≥ 0). In addition, we assume that v is continuous, which is a standard and practically
sound assumption. Hence, unless explicitly noted otherwise, we deal with the S-shaped value
function
v(x) =


v+(x) when x ≥ 0,
−v−(−x) when x < 0,
(1.1)
where v− , v+ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) are continuous, increasing, and concave functions such that
v−(0) = 0 = v+(0), v−(x) > 0 and v+(x) > 0 for all x > 0. Hence, we are dealing with
S-shaped functions, which are concave for gains and convex for losses. We refer to Gillen and
Markowitz (2009) for a taxonomy of value/utility functions with illuminating discussions.
It has been noted (cf. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Al-Nowaihi et al., 2008) that within
the prospect theory, the value function v takes on the special form
vλ(x) =


xα when x ≥ 0,
−λ(−x)β when x < 0,
(1.2)
provided that the so-called preference homogeneity holds, where α, β ∈ (0, 1] and λ > 0 are
some parameters. We refer to Wakker (2010) for a comprehensive treatment of the prospect
3
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theory, which is an extension of the classical utility theory to the case when in addition to
values being modified, their probabilities are also modified.
al-Nowaihi et al. (2008) have proved that the condition of preference homogeneity is
necessary and sufficient for the value function to be of form (1.2). Furthermore, al-Nowaihi
et al. (2008) have shown that under the additional and quite natural assumption of loss
aversion, the parameter λ must necessarily be greater than 1, and the other two parameters
α, β ∈ (0, 1] must be identical, that is, α = β. Thus, in this paper we call λ the loss aversion
parameter.
A natural generalization of function (1.2) under the assumption of loss aversion is there-
fore the following value function
vλ(x) =


u(x) when x ≥ 0,
−λu(−x) when x < 0,
(1.3)
which features prominently in the literature (e.g., Ko¨bberling and Wakker, 2005; Abdellaoui
et al., 2008; Jarnebrant et al., 2009; Wakker, 2010; Broll, et al., 2010; Egozcue et al., 2011;
and references therein), where we also find discussions concerning the loss aversion parameter
λ and the base utility function u : [0,∞) → [0,∞). Our present research also follows this
line of research, and we thus mainly deal with value function (1.3). We assume that the base
utility function u is continuous, increasing, concave, and such that u(0) = 0 and u(x) > 0
for all x > 0. The loss aversion parameter λ can be any positive real number.
Coming now back to our main discussion, we note that Thaler (1985) postulates four
basic principles, known as hedonic editing hypotheses, for integration and segregation:
P1. Segregate (two) exposure units with positive experiences.
P2. Integrate (two) exposure units with negative experiences.
P3. Integrate an exposure unit carrying a smaller negative experience with that carrying a
larger positive experience.
P4. Segregate an exposure unit carrying a larger negative experience from that carrying a
smaller positive experience.
Here we recall a footnote in Thaler (1985) saying that “[f]or simplicity I will deal only with
two-outcome events, but the principles generalize to cases with several outcomes.” When
4
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there are only two exposure units, then there can only be two possibilities: either integrate or
segregate. Mathematically, if the two exposure units with experiences x and y are integrated,
then their value is v(x+y), but if they are kept separately (i.e., segregated), then the value is
v(x)+v(y). For detailed analyses of this case, we refer to Fishburn and Luce (1995), Egozcue
and Wong (2010), and references therein. For example, Egozcue and Wong (2010) have found
that when facing small positive experiences and large negative ones, loss averters (see, e.g.,
Schmidt and Zank, 2008, and references therein) sometimes prefer to segregate, sometimes
to integrate, and at other times stay neutral. For a detailed analysis of the principle P4,
which is known as the ‘silver lining effect,’ we refer to Jarnebrant et al. (2009).
Our goal in this paper is to facilitate further understanding of Thaler’s principles and
their validity in the case of more than two exposure units. Note that when n ≥ 3, then in
addition to complete integration and segregation, there are possibilities of partial integration-
segregation.
We have organized the rest of the paper as follows. In Section 2 we give a complete
solution of the integration-segregation problem in the case of two exposure units, with expe-
riences of any sign, whereas in Section 3 we accomplish the task in the case of three exposure
units. In Section 4 we discuss the case of the arbitrary number of exposure units by set-
ting, naturally, more stringent assumptions than those in the previous sections. Section 5
concludes the paper with additional notes.
2 Case n = 2: integrate or not?
Even in the case of two exposure units (i.e., when n = 2), decisions whether to integrate
or segregate – and there can only be these two cases – crucially depend not only on the
experience values but also on the value function v. This problem has been investigated by
Egozcue and Wong (2010), among many others, but we shall give here a more complete
picture of the matter. For illustrating examples, we refer to, e.g., Lim (2006), Gilboa (2010),
and Kahneman (2011).
When we deal with only two experiences of same sign, then integration-segregation de-
cisions are simple, as the following theorem shows. Throughout the rest of the paper, the
value maximizer means the value maximizing decision maker.
5
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Theorem 2.1 The value maximizer with any value function v defined in (1.1) prefers to
segregate two exposure units with positive experiences and integrate those with negative ex-
periences.
To exemplify, we may view Theorem 2.1 as saying that the value maximizer prefers
to enjoy two positive experiences on, say, two different days, but if he faces two negative
experiences and has a choice over the timing, then he prefers to get over the experiences
as quickly as possible, say on the same day. Note that Theorem 2.1 does not impose any
restriction on the value function v, except those specified in definition (1.1). Finally, we note
that Theorem 2.1 is a special case of Theorem 4.1 to be established later in the paper.
The following theorem specifies those values of the parameter λ in the value-function vλ
for which integration or segregation is preferred in the case of two exposure units having
experiences of different signs.
Theorem 2.2 With the value function vλ defined in (1.3), assume that one exposure unit
has a positive experience x+ > 0 and another one has a negative experience x− < 0. Let
x = (x+, x−) and denote
T (x) =
u(x+)− u
(
max
{
0, x− + x+
})
u(−x−)− u
(
max
{
0,−(x− + x+)
}) . (2.1)
Then the value maximizer prefers integrating the two experiences if and only if T (x) ≤ λ
and segregating them if and only if T (x) ≥ λ.
Theorem 2.2 has been established by Egozcue and Wong (2010). We shall see in Section
4, which deals with an arbitrary number of exposure units, that Theorem 2.2 is a corollary
to our more general Theorem 4.2. Hence, we do not give a proof of Theorem 2.2 here.
For an illustration of Theorem 2.2, we suggest to think of a situation when, say, the
root-canal of one of our teeth has to be done and we try to decide whether this procedure
should be done on the day of an exciting concert (which would hopefully help us to forget the
unpleasant experience) or on a different day (so that we would not be bothered during the
concert by the earlier unpleasant experience). Personally, we find this a nontrivial choice,
and this is indeed reflected by the increased mathematical complexity of Theorem 2.2 if
compared to that of Theorem 2.1. For more examples, one may refer to, e.g., Gilboa (2010),
and Kahneman (2011).
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We are now in the position to elaborate on ‘our’ threshold T (x) and that used by Jarne-
brant et al. (2009). In short, the two thresholds delineate two different but closely related
regions: T (x) concerns with the integration-segregation region with respect to the loss aver-
sion parameter λ, whereas the threshold used by Jarnebrant et al. (2009) concerns with the
gain region by dividing it into two parts: in one, segregation is preferred, and in the other
part, integration. In more detail, Jarnebrant et al. (2009) specify conditions under which
the ‘silver lining effect’ occurs, assuming the same value-function vλ as in the present paper.
They show, for example, that if a gain is smaller than a certain gain-threshold, then segre-
gation is preferred. In contrast, our λ-based threshold is related to a certain value of the
loss aversion parameter λ: if it is smaller than the threshold, then segregation is preferred;
otherwise integration. Note also that the threshold T (x) has an explicit formula, whereas
a formula for the threshold used by Jarnebrant et al. (2009) is more difficult to arrive at.
Moreover, their definition is not yet clear for more than two exposure units, even for three
units, because in this case we could have, for example, two gains and a loss and would thus
be required to use a threshold-set of some kind, instead of just a threshold-parameter.
We next provide an insight into the magnitude of the threshold T (x); namely, whether
it is below or above 1. Knowing the answer is useful because if, for example, T (x) ≤ 1 and
the decision maker is loss averse, that is, λ ≥ 1, then Theorem 2.2 implies that the value
maximizer prefers integration.
Theorem 2.3 Assume that the conditions of Theorem 2.2 are satisfied, and thus among x1
and x2 there is one positive and one negative value. If x1 + x2 ≥ 0, then T (x) ≤ 1, and if
x1 + x2 ≤ 0, then T (x) ≥ 1.
Proof. We start with the case x1 + x2 ≥ 0. Then T (x) ≤ 1 is equivalent to u(x+)− u(x−+
x+) ≤ u(−x−), which using the notation y1 = −x− ≥ 0 and y2 = x− + x+ ≥ 0 can be
rewritten as the bound u(y1 + y2) ≤ u(y1) + u(y2). By Theorem 2.1, the latter bound holds,
which establishes T (x) ≤ 1. When x1 + x2 ≤ 0, then T (x) ≥ 1 is equivalent to the bound
u(x+) + u(−x− − x+) ≥ u(−x−). With the notation z1 = x+ ≥ 0 and z2 = −x− − x+ ≥ 0,
the above bound becomes u(z1 + z2) ≤ u(z1) + u(z2). By Theorem 2.1, the latter bound
holds, and so we have T (x) ≥ 1. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.3. 
We conclude this section with an illustrative example from marketing (cf., e.g., Drumwright,
1992, Heath et al., 1995, and references therein). Namely, let R denote the reservation price
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of a product, which is the largest price that the consumer is willing to pay in order to
acquire the product. Let M be the market price of the product. The consumer buys the
product if the consumer surplus is non-negative, that is, R −M ≥ 0. Assume for the sake
of concreteness that a company is manufacturing two products, A and B with the reserva-
tion prices RA = 21 and RB = 10, and with the market prices MA = 15 and MB = 15,
respectively. Following basic economic reasoning, we would predict that the consumer will
buy only the product A because the surplus is positive only for this product. However,
bundling can make the consumer attracted to buying the product B as well, thus increasing
the company’s revenue. We show this possibility as follows:
Suppose that the bundle of A and B sells at a price of 30. Then, according to the mental
accounting principles, the consumer would buy this bundle. Indeed, let the consumer be loss
averse in the sense that λ ≥ 1. Using our earlier adopted terminology, the two experiences
corresponding to A and B are x = RA −MA = 6 and y = RB −MB = −5, respectively.
The total experience is positive: x + y = 1. The value of the sum of the individually
purchased products is vλ(6) + vλ(−5). If they are bundled, then the consumer surplus is
(RA + RB) − (MA +MB) = 31 − 30 = 1, and the value is vλ(1). Applying Theorems 2.2
and 2.3 yields vλ(1) ≥ vλ(6) + vλ(−5), because λ ≥ 1 and T (x) ≡ T (6,−5) ≤ 1 and so
T (x) ≤ λ, which means ‘integration’ for the value maximizing decision maker. Hence, in
summary, the company is better off when the two products are bundled: the revenue is 30
by selling the two products bundled, whereas the revenue is just 15 when the two products
are sold separately, because in the latter case the consumer buys only the product A.
3 Case n = 3: which ones to integrate?
Complete integration or complete segregation may not result in the maximal value when
there are more than two exposure units, and thus a partial integration-segregation decision
could be better. In this section we shall give a complete solution to this problem in the case
of three exposure units (i.e., n = 3).
We begin with a note that the value maximizer with the value function v defined in
(1.1) prefers to segregate three exposure units with positive experiences, and integrate three
exposure units with negative experiences (we refer to Theorem 4.1 to be established later).
When there are mixed experiences (i.e., at least one positive and at least one negative), then
8
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integration-segregation decisions are complex. To illustrate, we next give an example (in two
parts) violating principles P3 and P4.
Example 3.1 Assume the value function
vλ,γ(x) =


xγ when x ≥ 0,
−λ(−x)γ when x < 0.
Countering P3: Suppose that λ = 1.4 and γ = 0.4. Let x = (2, 2,−3.99). The sum of the
experiences is
∑
xk = 0.01. Hence, a straightforward extension of Principle P3 with
n = 3 would suggest integrating the three exposure units into one, but the following
inequality implies the opposite: vλ,γ(
∑
xk) = 0.1584 <
∑
vλ,γ(xk) = 0.2039.
Countering P4: Suppose that λ = 2.25 and γ = 0.88. Let x = (0.5,−10,−20). The sum
of the experiences is
∑
xk = −29.5. Hence, a straightforward extension of Principle
P4 with n = 3 would suggest segregating the three exposure units, but the following
inequality says the opposite: vλ,γ(
∑
xk) = −44.2207 >
∑
vλ,γ(xk) = −47.9361.
Hence, we now see that neither complete segregation nor complete integration of three
(or more) experiences with mixed exposures may lead to maximal values. For this reason, we
next develop an exhaustive integration-segregation theory for three exposure units, which is
a fairly frequent case in practice. To illustrate, the following example is borrowed from the
telecommunications industry (Bell Aliant, 2012):
• TV + Internet + Home Phone: $99.00/month (regular $135.95)
• TV + Home Phone: $64.95/month (regular $98.95)
• TV + Internet: $94.95/month (regular $110.95)
• Internet + Home Phone: $69.95/month (regular $91.95)
Note from the prices that depending on factors such as the prices of individual products as
well as (likely unknown but guessed) underlying value functions, there are possibilities for
discounts due to bundling. Another popular example of bundling would be vacation packages
(e.g., Orbitz, 2012) that usually involve flight, hotel, and car; in various combinations.
Yet another popular bundle would be the office software suit, which among possibly many
‘auxiliary’ components, usually has the following three base components: word processor,
9
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spreadsheet, and presentation program. Note that the above examples concern with three
different products, as is generally the case throughout the current paper, but there can
also be, for example, ‘volume bundling’ of identical products, in which case we would deal
with identical x1, . . . , xn or, specifically to this section, with identical x, y, and z, that is,
x = y = z.
Unless explicitly noted otherwise, we shall work with the value function vλ defined by
equation (1.3). The three experiences are x, y, and z, and we assume that they satisfy
x+ y + z ≥ 0. (3.1)
The opposite case x + y + z ≤ 0 can be reduced to (3.1) as we shall see in a moment from
Note 3.1 below, and we thus skip a detailed analysis of the case. Furthermore, without loss
of generality we assume that
x ≥ y ≥ z, (3.2)
because every other case can be reduced to (3.2) by a simple change of notation. We also
assume without loss of generality that
x 6= 0, y 6= 0, z 6= 0, (3.3)
because if one of the three experiences is zero, then the case n = 3 reduces to n = 2. Finally,
we note that there are five possibilities for integrating-segregating three exposure units:
(A) vλ(x) + vλ(y) + vλ(z),
(B) vλ(x) + vλ(y + z),
(C) vλ(y) + vλ(x+ z),
(D) vλ(z) + vλ(x+ y),
(E) vλ(x+ y + z).
In summary, our goal in this section is to determine which of the above five possibilities
produces the largest value. We also want to know, and Note 3.1 below will explain why,
which of the five cases and under what conditions produces the smallest value. This is
exactly what Theorems 3.1–3.5 will establish below.
10
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Note 3.1 The reason for including the minimal values when only the maximal ones seem
to be of interest due to the fact that finding the maximal ones in the case x+ y+ z ≤ 0 can
be reduced to finding the minimal ones under the condition x+ y+ z ≥ 0. Indeed, note that
x+ y + z ≤ 0 is equivalent to x− + y− + z− ≥ 0 with the notation x− = −x, y− = −y, and
z− = −z. Since λ > 0, the equation
vλ(x) = −
1
λ∗
vλ∗(−x)
with λ∗ = 1/λ implies that finding the maximal value among (A)–(E) is equivalent to finding
the minimal value among the following five cases:
v1/λ(x
−) + v1/λ(y
−) + v1/λ(z
−),
v1/λ(x
−) + v1/λ(y
− + z−),
v1/λ(y
−) + v1/λ(x
− + z−),
v1/λ(z
−) + v1/λ(x
− + y−),
v1/λ(x
− + y− + z−).
The minimal values among the latter five cases will be easily derived from Theorems 3.1–3.5
below, where we only need to replace x, y, and z by x−, y−, and z−, respectively, and also
replace the parameter λ by 1/λ. 
Since from now on we are only concerned with the case x+ y+ z ≥ 0, we therefore know
that at least one of the three exposure units has a non-negative experience. Furthermore,
every triplet (x, y, z) falls into one of the following five cases:
x ≥ y ≥ z ≥ 0, (3.4)
x ≥ y ≥ 0 ≥ z and y ≥ −z, (3.5)
x ≥ y ≥ 0 ≥ z and x ≥ −z ≥ y, (3.6)
x ≥ y ≥ 0 ≥ z and − z ≥ x, (3.7)
x ≥ 0 ≥ y ≥ z. (3.8)
In the proofs of Theorems 3.1–3.5 below, we use notation such as “<.” To clarify its meaning,
we take, for example, the statement (A) < (E), which means that vλ(x) + vλ(y) + vλ(z) ≥
11
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vλ(x+ y+ z). Hence, (A) < (E) says in a concise way that the value maximizer prefers (A)
to (E). Naturally, the value minimizer – and we consider this case due to the reason given
in Note 3.1 – prefers (E) to (A) whenever the relationship (A) < (E) holds.
Theorem 3.1 (Case (3.4))
Max: (A) gives the maximal value among (A)–(E).
Min: (E) gives the minimal value among (A)–(E).
Proof. Since the three exposure units have non-negative experiences x, y, and z, their
complete segregation maximizes the value. Hence, (A) attains the maximal value among
(A)–(E). An analogous reasoning implies that complete integration, which is (E), attains
the minimal value. 
The following analysis of cases (3.5)–(3.8) is much more complex. We shall frequently use
a special case of the Hardy-Littlewood-Po´lya (HLP) majorization principle (e.g., Kuczma,
2009, p. 211). Namely, given two vectors (x1, x2) and (y1, y2), and also a continuous and
concave function v, we have the implication:
x1 ≥ x2, y1 ≥ y2
x1 + x2 = y1 + y2
x1 ≤ y1


=⇒ v(x1) + v(x2) ≥ v(y1) + v(y2). (3.9)
Theorem 3.2 (Case (3.5))
Max: With the threshold TAC = T (x, z), the following statements specify the two possible
maximal values among (A)–(E):
– If TAC ≥ λ, then (A).
– If TAC ≤ λ, then (C).
Min: With the threshold TDE = T (x+ y, z), the following statements specify the two possible
minimal values among (A)–(E):
– If TDE ≥ λ, then (E).
– If TDE ≤ λ, then (D).
12
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Proof. Since x and y are non-negative, from Theorem 4.1 we have that (A) < (D), and
since x and y + z are non-negative, the same theorem implies that (B) < (E). The proof of
(C) < (B) is more complex. Note that (C) < (B) is equivalent to
vλ(y) + vλ(x+ z) ≥ vλ(x) + vλ(y + z), (3.10)
which we establish as follows:
• When x + z ≥ y, we apply the HLP principle on the vectors (x + z, y) and (x, y + z)
and get vλ(x+ z) + vλ(y) ≥ vλ(x) + vλ(y + z), which is (3.10).
• When x+ z ≤ y, we apply the HLP principle on the vectors (y, x+ z) and (x, y + z),
and get vλ(y) + vλ(x+ z) ≥ vλ(x) + vλ(y + z), which is (3.10).
This completes the proof of inequality (3.10). Hence, in order to establish the ‘max’ part of
Theorem 3.2, we need to determine whether (A) or (C) is maximal, and for the ‘min’ part,
we need to determine whether (D) or (E) is minimal.
The ‘max’ part. Since x ≥ 0 and z ≤ 0, whether (A) or (C) is maximal is determined by
the threshold TAC : when TAC ≤ λ, then (C) < (A), and when TAC ≥ λ, then (A) < (C).
This concludes the proof of the ‘max’ part.
The ‘min’ part. Since x+y ≥ 0 and z ≤ 0, the threshold TDE = T (x+y, z) plays a decisive
role: if TDE ≤ λ, then (E) < (D), and if TDE ≥ λ, then (D) < (E). This concludes the
proof of the ‘min’ part and of Theorem 3.2 as well. 
Theorem 3.3 (Case (3.6))
Max: With the threshold TAC = T (x, z), the following statements specify the two possible
maximal values among (A)–(E):
– If TAC ≥ λ, then (A).
– If TAC ≤ λ, then (C).
Min: With the thresholds TBE = T (x, y + z), TDE = T (x+ y, z), and
TBD =
u(x+ y)− u(x)
u(−z)− u(−y − z)
,
the following statements specify the three possible minimal values among (A)–(E):
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– If TBE ≤ λ and TBD ≥ λ, then (B).
– If TDE ≤ λ and TBD ≤ λ, then (D).
– If TBE ≥ λ and TDE ≥ λ, then (E).
Proof. Since x and y are non-negative, we have (A) < (D), and since y and x + z are
non-negative, we have (C) < (E). Hence, it remains to consider only cases (A), (B), and
(C) for the ‘max’ part of the theorem, and only (B), (D), and (E) for the ‘min’ part.
The ‘max’ part. First we show that TAC ≤ TAB. Since x + z ≥ 0, from Theorem 2.3 we
have TAC ≤ 1, and since y + z ≤ 0, the same theorem implies TAB ≥ 1. Hence, TAC ≤ TAB.
To establish that (A) is maximal when TAC ≥ λ, we check that (A) < (B) and (A) < (C).
The former statement holds when TAB = T (y, z) ≥ λ, and the latter when TAC = T (x, z) ≥
λ. But we already know that TAC ≤ TAB. Therefore, when TAC ≥ λ, then TAB ≥ λ. This
proves that when TAC ≥ λ, then (A) gives the maximal value among (A), (B), and (C), and
thus, in turn, among all (A)–(E).
To establish that (C) is the maximal when TAC ≤ λ, we need to check that (C) < (A)
and (C) < (B). First we note that when TAC ≤ λ, then (C) < (A). Furthermore,
vλ(x) + vλ(y + z) ≤ vλ(y) + vλ(x+ z)⇐⇒ u(x)− λu(−y − z) ≤ u(y) + u(x+ z)
⇐⇒ TBC ≤ λ,
where TBC is defined by the equation
TBC =
u(x)− u(x+ z)− u(y)
u(−y − z)
.
Hence, when TBC ≤ λ, then (C) < (B). Simple algebra shows that the bound TBC ≤ TAB
is equivalent to TAC ≤ TAB, and we already know that the latter holds. Hence, TBC ≤ TAB
and so TBC ≤ λ when TAC ≤ λ. In summary, when TAC ≤ λ, then (C) gives the maximal
value among all cases (A)–(E). This concludes the proof of the ‘max’ part.
The ‘min’ part. We first establish conditions under which (B) is minimal. We have (E) <
(B) when TBE ≤ λ. To have (D) < (B), we need to employ the threshold TBD, which
is defined in the formulation of the theorem. The role of the threshold is seen from the
14
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following equivalence relations:
vλ(x) + vλ(y + z) ≤ vλ(z) + vλ(x+ y)⇐⇒ u(x)− λu(−y − z) ≤ −λu(−z) + u(x+ y)
⇐⇒ λ ≤ TBD.
Hence, if TBD ≥ λ, then (D) < (B). In summary, when TBE ≤ λ and TBD ≥ λ, then (B)
gives the minimal value among all (A)–(E).
We next establish conditions under which (D) is minimal. First, we have (E) < (D)
when TDE ≤ λ. Next, we have (B) < (D) when TBD ≤ λ. In summary, when TDE ≤ λ and
TBD ≤ λ, then (D) gives the minimal value among all (A)–(E).
Finally, we have (B) < (E) when TBE ≥ λ, and (D) < (E) when TDE ≥ λ. Hence, when
TBE ≥ λ and TDE ≥ λ, then (E) is minimal among all (A)–(E). This finishes the proof of
the ‘min’ part, and thus of Theorem 3.3 as well. 
Theorem 3.4 (Case (3.7))
Max: With the threshold
TAE =
u(x) + u(y)− u(x+ y + z)
u(−z)
,
the following statements specify the two possible maximal values among (A)–(E):
– If TAE ≥ λ, then (A).
– If TAE ≤ λ, then (E).
Min: With the thresholds TAC = T (x, z), TBE = T (x, y + z), TCE = T (y, x + z), TDE =
T (x+ y, z), and
TBC =
u(x)− u(y)
u(−y − z)− u(−x− z)
,
TBD =
u(x+ y)− u(x)
u(−z)− u(−y − z)
,
TCD =
u(x+ y)− u(y)
u(−z)− u(−x− z)
,
the following statements specify the four possible minimal values among (A)–(E):
– If TBE ≤ λ, TBC ≤ λ, and TBD ≥ λ, then (B).
– If TCE ≤ λ, TBC ≥ λ, and TCD ≥ λ, then (C).
– If TDE ≤ λ, TBD ≤ λ, and TCD ≤ λ, then (D).
15
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– If TBE ≥ λ, TCE ≥ λ, and TDE ≥ λ, then (E).
Proof. Since both x and y are non-negative, we have (A) < (D). This eliminates (D) from
the ‘max’ part of Theorem 3.4 and (A) from the ‘min’ part.
The ‘max’ part. We first eliminate (B). When TBE ≤ λ, then (E) < (B). If, however,
TBE ≥ λ, then by Theorem 4.2 in the next section we have (B) < (E). We shall next
show that in this case we also have (A) < (B), thus making (B) unattractive to the value
maximizer. Since y + z ≤ 0 and x + y + z ≥ 0, we have from Theorem 2.3 that TBE ≤ 1.
Theorem 2.3 also implies that TAC ≥ 1 because x+z ≤ 0. Hence, TBE ≤ TAB. Since TBE ≥ λ,
we conclude that TAB ≥ λ. By Theorem 4.2 of the next section, the latter bound implies
(A) < (B). Therefore, the value maximizer will not choose (B). Analogous arguments but
with TCE and TAC instead of TBE and TAB, respectively, show that the value maximizer will
not choose (C) either. Hence, in summary, we are left with only two cases: (A) and (E).
Which of the two maximizes the value is determined by the following equivalence relations:
vλ(x) + vλ(y) + vλ(z) ≤ vλ(x+ y + z)⇐⇒ u(x) + u(y)− λu(−z) ≤ u(x+ y + z)
⇐⇒ TAE ≤ λ.
This concludes the proof of the ‘max’ part.
The ‘min’ part. To prove the ‘min’ part, we only need to deal with (B)–(E) because we
already know that (A) < (D). Case (E) gives the minimal value when TBE ≥ λ, TCE ≥ λ,
and TDE ≥ λ. If, however, there is at least one among TBE, TCE, and TDE not exceeding λ,
then the minimum is achieved by one of (B), (C), and (D). To determine which of them and
when is minimal, we employ simple algebra and obtain the following equivalence relations:


(C) < (B)⇐⇒ TBC ≤ λ
(D) < (B)⇐⇒ TBD ≥ λ
(E) < (B)⇐⇒ TBE ≤ λ

 ,


(B) < (C)⇐⇒ TBC ≥ λ
(D) < (C)⇐⇒ TCD ≥ λ
(E) < (C)⇐⇒ TCE ≤ λ

 ,


(B) < (D)⇐⇒ TBD ≤ λ
(C) < (D)⇐⇒ TCD ≤ λ
(E) < (D)⇐⇒ TDE ≤ λ

 .
This finishes the proof of Theorem 3.4. 
Theorem 3.5 (Case (3.8))
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Max: With the thresholds TBE = T (x, y + z), TCE = T (x+ z, y), TDE = T (x+ y, z), and
TBC =
u(x)− u(x+ z)
u(−y − z)− u(−y)
,
TBD =
u(x)− u(x+ y)
u(−y − z)− u(−z)
,
TCD =
u(x+ y)− u(x+ z)
u(−z)− u(−y)
,
the following statements specify the four possible maximal values among (A)–(E):
– If TBE ≥ λ, TBC ≥ λ, and TBD ≥ λ, then (B).
– If TCE ≥ λ, TBC ≤ λ, and TCD ≤ λ, then (C).
– If TDE ≥ λ, TBD ≤ λ, and TCD ≥ λ, then (D).
– If TBE ≤ λ, TCE ≤ λ, and TDE ≤ λ, then (E).
Min: With the thresholds TAC = T (x, z), TAD = T (x, y),
TAE =
u(x)− u(x+ y + z)
u(−y) + u(−z)
,
and the other ones defined in the ‘max’ part of this theorem, the following statements
specify the four possible minimal values among (A)–(E):
– If TAC ≤ λ, TAD ≤ λ, and TAE ≤ λ, then (A).
– If TAC ≥ λ, TCD ≥ λ, and TCE ≤ λ, then (C).
– If TAD ≥ λ, TCD ≤ λ, and TDE ≤ λ, then (D).
– If TAE ≥ λ, TCE ≥ λ, and TDE ≥ λ, then (E).
Proof. Since −y ≥ 0 and −z ≥ 0, we have from inequality (4.1) that u(−y) + u(−z) ≥
u(−(y + z)) and thus −λu(−y) − λu(−z) ≤ −λu(−(y + z)). The latter is equivalent to
vλ(y) + vλ(z) ≤ vλ(y + z), which means that (B) < (A).
The ‘max’ part. We have four cases (B)–(E) to deal with. To determine which of them
results in a maximal value, we employ simple algebra and obtain the following equivalence
relations:

(B) < (C)⇐⇒ TBC ≥ λ
(B) < (D)⇐⇒ TBD ≥ λ
(B) < (E)⇐⇒ TBE ≥ λ

 ,


(C) < (B)⇐⇒ TBC ≤ λ
(C) < (D)⇐⇒ TCD ≤ λ
(C) < (E)⇐⇒ TCE ≥ λ

 ,


(D) < (B)⇐⇒ TBD ≤ λ
(D) < (C)⇐⇒ TCD ≥ λ
(D) < (E)⇐⇒ TDE ≥ λ

 .
This finishes the proof of the ‘max’ part.
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The ‘min’ part. To prove the ‘min’ part of the theorem, we easily verify the following four
sets of orderings:


(C) < (A)⇐⇒ TAC ≤ λ
(D) < (A)⇐⇒ TAD ≤ λ
(E) < (A)⇐⇒ TAE ≤ λ

 ,


(A) < (C)⇐⇒ TAC ≥ λ
(D) < (C)⇐⇒ TCD ≥ λ
(E) < (C)⇐⇒ TCE ≤ λ

 ,


(A) < (D)⇐⇒ TAD ≥ λ
(C) < (D)⇐⇒ TCD ≤ λ
(E) < (D)⇐⇒ TDE ≤ λ

 ,


(A) < (E)⇐⇒ TAE ≥ λ
(C) < (E)⇐⇒ TCE ≥ λ
(D) < (E)⇐⇒ TDE ≥ λ

 .
This concludes the proof of the ‘min’ part and that of Theorem 3.5 as well. 
We conclude this section with a note that there might be situations when the decision
maker is allowed, or prefers, to only partially integrate, say, non-negative experiences. In
such cases, a generalization of Lim’s (1971) inequality (cf. Kuczma, 2009) plays a decisive
role. Namely, for any continuous and concave function v : [0,∞) → R and for any triplet
(x1, x2, x3) of non-negative real numbers, we have that if x3 ≥ x1 + x2, then v(x1) + v(x2 +
x3) ≤ v(x1 + x2) + v(x3). This implies in particular that if we have three exposure units
with positive experiences and if for some reason we can only integrate two of them, then in
order to decide whether, say, x2 should be integrated with x1 or x3, the value maximizer will
verify the condition x3 ≥ x1 + x2, and if it holds, then x2 should be integrated with x1.
4 Arbitrary number of exposure units
We already know that when n = 3, then we have 5 cases to analyze. This number 5 – in the
context of the present paper – turns out to be the fourth member of the Bell sequence
1, 1, 2, 5, 15, 52, 203, 877, 4140, 21147, . . .
(e.g., On-Line Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences, 2012). When n = 4, then we have 15 cases
to analyze, which is definitely too large a number for a similarly detailed analysis, let alone
any of the cases n ≥ 5. Various partial scenarios, however, are quite reasonable to look at
even for general n, and we shall next discuss some of them. For this we first observe that from
the mathematical point of view, the integration-segregation rules are about the super- and
sub-additivity of value functions. Decision makers, however, tend to ‘visualize’ the functions
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in terms of their shapes, such as concavity or convexity. A link between the additivity and
concavity notions is accomplished by functional inequalities, such as Petrovic´’s inequality
(see, e.g., Kuczma, 2009), which says that for every n ≥ 2 and for every continuous and
concave function v : [0,∞)→ R such that v(0) = 0, the inequality
v
( n∑
k=1
xk
)
≤
n∑
k=1
v(xk) (4.1)
holds for all x1, . . . , xn ∈ [0,∞). In other words, inequality (4.1) says that the value function
v is subadditive on [0,∞). This implies that the value maximizer prefers to segregate positive
experiences. In the domain (−∞, 0] of losses, the roles of integration and segregation are
reversed. Collecting the above observations, we have the following general theorem.
Theorem 4.1 The value maximizer with any value function v defined in (1.1) prefers to
segregate any number of exposure units with positive experiences, and integrate any number
of exposure units with negative experiences.
Theorem 4.1 rules out mixed experiences. We shall next relax this assumption, but at
the expense of generality. First, we restrict ourselves to the value function vλ. Second, we
restrict our attention to learning if it is preferable to integrate all exposure units or to keep
them all segregated, and no other option is available, or of interest, to us. The number of
exposure units n ≥ 2 remains arbitrary.
Theorem 4.2 With x = (x1, . . . , xn), we define the threshold T (x) by
T (x) =
∑
k∈K+
u(xk)− u
(
max
{
0,
n∑
k=1
xk
})
∑
k∈K−
u(−xk)− u
(
max
{
0,−
n∑
k=1
xk
}) ,
which is always non-negative, where K+ = {k : xk > 0} and K− = {k : xk < 0} are two
subsets of {1, . . . , n}. The threshold T (x) splits the values of the loss aversion parameter λ
into two regions – integration and segregation – as follows: assuming that there is at least
one exposure unit with a positive experience and at least one with a negative experience, and
given that either complete integration or complete segregation of all exposure units is possible,
then the value maximizer prefers
• integrating the exposure units if and only if T (x) ≤ λ, and
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• segregating the exposure units if and only if T (x) ≥ λ.
Proof. We start with the case
∑n
k=1 xk ≥ 0. The inequality vλ(
∑n
k=1 xk) ≤
∑n
k=1 vλ(xk) is
equivalent to
u
( n∑
k=1
xk
)
≤ −λ
∑
k∈K−
u(−xk) +
∑
k∈K+
u(xk),
which, in turn, is equivalent to
λ ≤ T+(x) ≡
∑
k∈K+
u(xk)− u
( n∑
k=1
xk
)
∑
k∈K−
u(−xk)
. (4.2)
Since
∑n
k=1 xk ≥ 0, we have T+(x) = T (x). To show that T (x) is non-negative, we first note
that since the function u is non-decreasing and
∑
k∈K−
xk ≤ 0, we have
∑
k∈K+
u(xk)− u
( n∑
k=1
xk
)
=
∑
k∈K+
u(xk)− u
( ∑
k∈K+
xk +
∑
k∈K−
xk
)
≥
∑
k∈K+
u(xk)− u
( ∑
k∈K+
xk
)
. (4.3)
In addition, since the function u : [0,∞) → R is continuous, concave, and u(0) = 0, the
right-hand side of bound (4.3) is non-negative. Hence, T+(x) ≥ 0.
Considering now the case
∑n
k=1 xk ≤ 0, we find that vλ(
∑n
k=1 xk) ≤
∑n
k=1 vλ(xk) is
equivalent to
λ
∑
k∈K−
u(−xk)− λu
(
−
n∑
k=1
xk
)
≤
∑
k∈K+
u(xk). (4.4)
Since the function u is non-decreasing and
∑
k∈K+
xk ≥ 0, we have that
∑
k∈K−
u(−xk)− u
(
−
n∑
k=1
xk
)
=
∑
k∈K−
u(−xk)− u
(
−
∑
k∈K−
xk −
∑
k∈K+
xk
)
≥
∑
k∈K−
u(−xk)− u
(
−
∑
k∈K−
xk
)
. (4.5)
Since the function u : [0,∞)→ R is continuous, concave, and u(0) = 0, the right-hand side
of bound (4.5) is non-negative. Hence, inequality (4.4) is equivalent to
λ ≤ T−(x) ≡
∑
k∈K+
u(xk)
∑
k∈K−
u(−xk)− u
(
−
n∑
k=1
xk
) . (4.6)
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Given the above, we have T−(x) ≥ 0. Furthermore, since
∑n
k=1 xk ≤ 0, we have T−(x) =
T (x). This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2. 
5 Concluding notes
A number of empirical works have analyzed decision maker’s behavior in the case of multiple
exposure units. For example, Loughran and Ritter (2002), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005),
and Lim (2006) examine how mental accounting of multiple outcomes affects the behavior
of market participants in various contexts of business and finance.
As far as we know, there has not been a detailed theoretical analysis of decision maker’s
behavior in the case of multiple exposure units. In this paper, we have provided such an
analysis, concentrating on two and three exposure units, and we have also noted possible
results in the case of arbitrary number of exposure units. Our theoretical analysis has shown
that the number of integration-segregation options for more than three exposure units is
so large that, generally, a well-informed integration-segregation decision becomes quite an
unwieldy task.
Naturally, under such circumstances, we may think of employing computer-based search
algorithms, but this computational approach would require us to specify the underlying value
function, which is usually unknown in practice, except that it belongs to a certain class of
functions depending on the problem at hand. Hence, in this paper we have aimed at deriving
integration and segregation decisions that are qualitative in nature and applicable to classes
of value functions pertaining to fairly general groups of customers.
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